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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE TERRORIST THREAT: ALTERNATIVES TO POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANCIS J. WIERCINSKI United States Army

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The Terrorist Threat: Alternatives to Policy in the

Post Cold War

by

LTC Francis J. Wiercinski

COL Jack Ellertson Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Francis J. Wiercinski

TITLE: The Terrorist Threat: Alternatives to Policy in the

Post Cold War

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 06 April 1998 PAGES: 40 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Although both our national and military strategies focused on policies to thwart the rise of terrorism, since the mid 1960's our base strategy has changed very little. Unfortunately, the current fracture of nation states, the plausible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growing abyss of religious, political, and economic views, and the international exportation of terrorism are all elements of the rising tide of criminal acts of violence.

While the ways and means of our current policy are supportable by the elements of our national power, the ends do not sufficiently address the future national interests of security against terrorism. Only a new and more aggressive strategy will meet this upcoming challenge.

A policy toward the full integration of international cooperative capabilities including counter-terrorism, anti-terrorism, and combined international powers is the only real

combat for terrorism. This must include a rededication toward a hard line against all terrorists, a commitment to international political and economic pressure on state sponsors of terrorism, application of force where appropriate, and the exercise of effective counter-terrorism measures. For the West to survive in the new world order, cooperation, diligence, and an effective international campaign against terrorism must be the solution.

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A WORLD IN TERROR

Whether the statistics are up or down, the United States, the world's preeminent capitalistic democracy, excites the hatred and envy of nihilists, religious fanatics, non-democratic states, criminals, and political marginal groups across the globe. 1

- Bruce D. Teft

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the abrupt end to the Cold War propelled the United States into a new world order and fractured the "status quo" of bi-polar supremacy. In the past, our national and military security strategies have justifiably focused on the threat of major regional conflicts. Today, based in large part to that very change in world order, more asymmetrical threats arise to leverage our national security strategy. Terrorism looms as an ever increasing threat. Unchecked, it can shift the risk factor of the spectrum of war to increasingly greater levels.

Although both our national and military strategies focused on policies to thwart the rise of terrorism, since the mid 1960's our base strategy has changed very little. The defensive tactics over the years adopted a "Quid Pro Quo" type of relationship. As terrorist activities continued to grow, the West developed subtle defenses to combat the emerging threat. Even during the traumatic period of terrorist activity between 1980 and 1990,

although irresolute at best, it appears by the end of the decade we were capable of finally adopting an effective tactic.

However, with the current fracture of nation states, the plausible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growing abyss of religious, political, and economic views, and the international exportation of terrorism are all elements of the rising tide of criminal acts of violence. Terrorism is warfare, although as the British Lord Chalfont observed back in 1986, "The Western democracies are still not aware of it as warfare against them."

BACKGROUND

TERRORISM IN THE 1970S:

"During the 1970s, the popular method of terrorism could be classified as "events of duration." We recall the dramatic hostage-taking events of the period. The advances of media coverage and technology added to the intensity and relativity of the ongoing events and gave the terrorist the world stage upon which to perform. Discussion and negotiation over political demands were the status quo of the era as ordinary citizens became international figures of diplomacy and terror.

The motives of the period were primary political, targeting key political and industrial leaders, utilizing hostages, hijacking, bombs, small arms, ransom and blackmail. Small groups backed by special interest groups dominated the scene in an effort to win concessions from more financially, militarily, and politically established world powers. This also became an open forum to make a statement - to demonstrate to the world the resolve and intensity of the terrorist.

One of the most famous demonstrations of this pattern of violence was the hostage incident during the 1972 Munich Olympics. Palestinian terrorists, known as the Black September group, took Israeli athletes hostage. The culminating point was the death of the terrorists and several of the Israeli athletes. The absolute sanctity of the previously peaceful Olympic Games had suddenly come to an unfortunate passage. The terrorist's stage was perhaps the most televised international event of that time. The world watched in horror as the devastating effects and power of such desperate acts emerged.

Certainly, major changes in the security structure and defense of the Olympic venues changed forever based on that one singular event. The counter-terrorist forces of host nations and participating governments exercise great effort in the control,

security and safety of athletes and spectators alike. In fact, throughout this decade, the West adopted an overall counter-terrorism strategy based on international cooperation to share intelligence, resources, and a resolve to back legal actions in the pursuit, capture and punishment of terrorists. Perhaps this was also the setting for the future of terrorism.

TERRORISM IN THE 1980S:

As the tactics and strategy of targeted nations and individuals changed to counter the threat, so too did the terrorist's tactics evolve. In the 1980s, the popular method of terrorist attack changed to "conclusive events." These included bombings and other types of killing that happened too quickly to allow a response by counter-terrorist forces. Again, we recall spectacular catastrophic events ranging from major airline to cruise line hi-jacking. The horrific airline bombings, air terminal raids, and night club bombings highlight the intense carnage of the 80s. Additionally, we notice a distinct shift in the most active region of terrorism from Western Europe to Latin America.

The motives of the 80s terrorist began to stretch from solely political aims to those which included religious and economic goals as well. Islamic fundamentalism and narcotics-terrorism support the rising religious and economic furor respectively. In Columbia alone, the vast monetary gains due to drug trafficking have been the root cause of multiple political assassinations. Since 1989, Columbia has lost four presidential candidates, more than sixty judges, more than seventy journalists, and more than 1,000 police officers were killed by the traffickers. Columbia however did not shoulder the sole brunt of terrorist acts in the 80s.

Throughout the decade increasing numbers of attacks against United States military personnel began to intensify. A rash of bombings directed against U.S. citizens in 1985, demonstrated the increasing direction of terrorist targets directly against Western democracies. "Half of the worldwide incidents in the 1980s were aimed at only 10 countries; one third of the total were targeted directly at the United States. Attacks which caused 20 fatalities in 1968 were now compared to a rising 926 casualties by 1985." 10

TERRORISM OF THE 1990S:

"The 1990s were ushered in by what appeared on the surface as a new era of peace." Compared to the previous decade, the number of incidents had declined. Most could argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced terrorist funding and support and would therefore degrade the terrorist ability to wage war. With the United States left as the only remaining superpower, it would be difficult for other states to not only conduct state sponsored terrorism, but also create traditional armies large enough to threaten the Western democracies. Unfortunately, this prospect does not hold true.

Outlaw nation states, as well as non-traditional actors began to emerge to fill the void created by the former USSR. Countries which included Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, together with a growing partnership with organized crime, threatened this new "era of peace". 12

Where countries could not compete with Western military, economic, and diplomatic clout, terrorism acted as their deployable global army. The economic pressures placed more and more emphasis on weapons and tactics that provided a bigger bang for the buck. "For years, the conventional wisdom stated that weapons of mass destruction did not serve the goals of

terrorists". 13 Once again, this mind set exposed a major fault in our upcoming strategy with terror.

TERRORISM IN AN ERA OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:

The thought of a terrorist using a weapon of mass destruction that could cause thousands of casualties anywhere and anytime is a fearful enough concept on its own. Ironically, the environment of peace in the 90s and the abrupt end to the Cold War only adds to the actual possibility of such a catastrophic event. Recent events demonstrate the relative simplicity of building a chemical or biological weapon small enough to hide and transport anywhere in the world. To the terrorist, these weapons become as effective as any army. The added threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology, and the necessary materials to produce such weapons only fuel the danger.

How critical is this current assessment? As he retired from the United States Senate, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia referred to the combination of weapons of mass destruction with terrorism as "our number one national security threat." 14

The first threat by terrorists to explode a nuclear bomb in the United States was made against the city of Boston in 1974. Since then, the Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team has responded to more than 80 nuclear bomb threats against the United States that were deemed credible. 15

Obviously none of the threats proved true, however, it may just be a matter of time - a question of not if, but when.

Nuclear technology, once thought to be the domain of superpowers, is now easily obtained directly from the Internet. Nuclear fission and fusion material continues to make news headlines as customs and security officials halt potential smuggling attempts on our borders. German Intelligence alone publicly acknowledged 293 cases of the illegal procurement of nuclear material in 1994 and 1995. 16

Today, the Quid-Pro-Quo policies of the past can not withstand the incredible growth in terrorist potential.

CURRENT POLICY

As stated in the most recent National Security Strategy, our current policy to combat international terrorism rests on the following principles:

- (1) make no concessions to terrorists;
- (2) bring all pressure to bear on state sponsored terrorism;
- (3) fully exploit all legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists; and
- (4) help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. 17

A review of past strategies and policies over the years demonstrates little deviation from this forum. ¹⁸ In light of the recent dramatic changes in world order, this current policy deserves significant study and possible revision.

ANALYSIS

On the surface, the current policy appears to adequately meet the challenges of future terrorist threats. While the ways and means of this strategy are supportable by the elements of our national power, opponents of this policy will argue that the ends do not meet or sufficiently address the future national interests of security. To fully understand that position, we must reevaluate each element.

MAKE NO CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS.

Although the Iran-Contra Affair would appear to dispute our resoluteness to this policy, the ultimate outcome of that situation did in fact prove the previous assumption that the "nodeals" policy does work. The hostages were finally released after the terrorists realized no further gain or concessions would be made. The subsequent lack of terrorist ransom attempts against U.S. citizens lends strong credibility to this element of

the policy. It is clear that in any future shift in policy, a "no-deals" condition must remain in effect.

The resolve and conditions required for this enduring posture will require ever increasing diplomatic and political savvy. Coalition support and a multinational effort will certainly be the focus of any such enterprise. As we are currently experiencing in the recent Iraq Crisis, this situation may be an increasingly difficult obstacle to overcome. Many of the agents of terrorism, although not directly tied to many of the law abiding nation states, still maintain strong political, religious and regional ties. This again is most evident in the reluctance of many Arab states to fully support United States efforts against Saddam Hussein, arguably the greatest terrorist of all.

BRING ALL PRESSURE TO BEAR ON STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM.

The past sponsorship of terrorism by countries like Iran,
Iraq, and Libya, with the additional political, logistical, and
financial support from the former Soviet Union, combined to
provide a viable asset to many terrorist organizations. The
1990s combined the power of other rogue states with traditionally
non-state actors to take up where the Soviet Union left off.
Chinese triads, Russian Mafia, organized crime, Cali Cartel drug

lords, Algerian separatists, and a host of emerging asymmetrical threats arise daily to promote unrest and instability. Much effort is required to combat all these factions. Although several states have paid a price for their support of terrorists, encountering diplomatic, economic, and even military punishment from the United States, retaliation is not the exclusive solution.²⁰

As an example of our resolve, the United States retaliated against state sponsors of terrorism with some effect; in 1986 on a raid against Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, and again in 1993 against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. Proponents of this policy quickly point out the effectiveness of the Libyan raid by the subsequent "quieting" of Qaddafi. Some experts even address the residual chastening effect of such retaliatory actions. The same proponents will argue that the end of the Cold War suggests an end of sufficient state sponsored terrorism, thereby cutting off the supportive arm of terrorism. Unfortunately, neither component of this assertion appears valid.

The retaliatory - vice preemptive - raids on Libya and Iraq only served to further flame the violence. In actuality, more Americans died at the hands of Libyan terrorists after the raid than before it.²² The scarcity of state sponsors for terrorism

has a more ominous result than merely a loss of safe havens for terrorists. These groups are no longer tied to the political agendas of sponsor states and may be less restrained in their violence. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, due to the loss of control and economic instability from the breakup of the former Soviet Union, could prove disastrous.

Arms imports are still over \$20 billion a year, with \$17 billion going to the third world and over 20 states directly involved in the purchase of weapons of mass destruction. An isolated policy relying on continued pressure of former state sponsors of terrorism, although still valid and of useful purpose, does not thoroughly address the growing "wild card" terrorist organizations.

FULLY EXPLOIT ALL AVAILABLE LEGAL MECHANISMS

As Americans we have come to cherish the laws of the nation for the protection of our citizens. We can enforce our own laws as a sovereign nation and adjudicate appropriately. International law however is entirely different. Although there are several instances where terrorists have been brought to trial, international laws take the form of treaties or conventions.²⁵

Extradition is but one of the many issues that "muddy" the situation. Due to these differences, "the law is in sad condition when it comes to dealing with terrorists and international terrorism." Inability to bring to justice high profile acts of terrorism such as, Pan Am Flight 103 and the U.S. Embassy crisis in Tehran highlight the difficulty with international law in the execution of this policy.

There are also hidden dangers here in what may appear to some as a conflict of our policy and fairness in applying this statute. In recent years critics may be quick to note that our application of policy toward the IRA, the PLO, and even Bosnia are somewhat suspect in our total commitment toward a hard line stand on terrorists.

Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams has done a great job of convincing the public of its mainstream actions and there is a great danger in falling to the temptations to "legitimize" the political wings of some terrorist groups.²⁷

In the interest of Mid East peace and an apparent new found willingness to reject terrorist activities on his part, we have come to negotiate with Yasser Arafat of the PLO. Additionally, although certainly far from conception at this point, is the

appearance of an upcoming reproach with Iran based on their willingness to "meet the West."

Even our reluctance and current policy to actively seek

United Nations designated and suspected war criminals in Bosnia for the sake of a fragile peace - is certainly looked upon with

suspicion and skepticism by our critics as an example of our lack
of "true resolve". From the outside, without the benefit of

diplomatic insight and investigation, it appears that we are in
fact willing to accept the terrorist evils of some to secure a

better future. Finally, the fourth major point of current

policy:

HELP OTHER GOVERNMENTS IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITIES.

Since the 1960's, the international community has made great strides toward cooperation and anti-terrorist initiatives. As previously expressed, the international cooperation of the past was the strength of the 70s and 80s combined multinational efforts to combat terrorism. The elimination of terrorist sanctuaries, improved diplomatic, economic, and intelligence activities, improved aviation security world wide, and increased vigilance all support the recent downward trend in activity. However, these policies were based on pre Cold War assumptions.

It is now imperative to reassess our commitment and strategies, and rebuild a solid coalition against the future of terrorism.

With current policy as a base, several alternate courses of action (COA) may be suitable to fill the void of an adequate terrorist strategy in the post Cold War Era. We will analyze each COA with respect to our National Objectives (ends), National Strategic Concepts (ways), National Resources (means), and the accompanied risks associated with each.

COA 1: AGGRESSIVE UNILATERAL ANTI-TERRORIST STRATEGY.

Anti-terrorist strategy is by definition, offensive minded. This is a strategy of proactive and preemptive strikes against known terrorist targets, states, and individual leaders. It must include massive intelligence networks to support such operations. There are a variety of established monitoring capabilities available to the technologically based West. Signal intelligence (SIGINT) analysis of all communications and signal transmissions across all bands of frequency could provide early warning to attacks, identify key players and possible locations. Imagery, technical, and measurement intelligence are also available. Terrorists have also learned of these abilities and

developed more and more sophisticated defensive measures to capitalize on their limitations and vulnerabilities.

There is however no substitute for human intelligence (HUMINT) in the combat against terrorism. In an offensive antiterrorist scenario this requires human presence and infiltration into the very structure of the terrorist organization with the intent of disruption from the inside out.

The anti-terrorist course of action does not rule out the potential for planned assassinations. Described by Israeli Brigadier General Gideon Machanaimi, "The best way, or lets say the successful way, to combat terrorism is to assassinate terrorist leaders. Once one of the leaders is assassinated, we found a long period of peace in the area." 29

As distasteful as this initially appears, we find ourselves during the current Iraq Crisis with opinion polls which actually show a large percentage of the population favoring the outright assassination of Saddam Hussein rather than risk all out war. In our current policy and system of government, this would now take Executive Action. President Reagan signed the executive order "Prohibition on Assassination" on 4 December 1981 which prohibits any U.S. operation or agency from targeting any individual for the purpose of assassination. Occreainly ten years ago this

would not only have been an unlawful option but also considered inconceivable.

Direct military strike operations are of course possible and occasionally utilized for anti terrorist options. Various West European governments to include the Italians, Germany, Great Britain, France, Israel, and the United States have designated elite units specifically trained for direct action against terrorist activity.³¹

Options for the United States in this arena range from direct covert action, hostage rescue, surgical air strike, and raids and ambushes against known targets. Inherent difficulties are obvious. Absolute intelligence is a must. World opinion is always at stake. Collateral damage of friendly or civilian casualties could have dramatic effects that actually work in the terrorists' favor. Although hostage rescue would appear to have greatest support, all other actions tend to require strong diplomatic resolutions and support.

There is also the lure of the effects of special operations to complete dangerous and seemingly impossible operations. Spy novels and motion pictures portray abilities to overcome amazing obstacles. The missions appear impossible because they are. The great spy novelist, John Le Carre, was once asked if he consulted

with experts on intelligence matters. Le Carre responded, "Those who believe they are masters of the black arts are as inept as we amateurs. I invent most of it." 32

While this offensive policy treats terrorism as true warfare and suggests the application of sufficient ways and means to support such objectives, this aggressive approach is flawed. The government supports current terrorist policy with the necessary resources and trains limited strategic and tactical forces for anti-terrorist operations - predominately focused at hostage rescue and security. Escalation to the next level would inherently entail major force and budgetary increases to adequately support both the intelligence gathering and execution of such a strategy.

In concept, unilateral offensive action within the boundaries of other nation states, against individuals as well as organizations, is currently an unacceptable option. Public opinion, both national and international, will not condone such actions. Without prior coordination, agreements, and international commitments, the US would quickly become a rogue state in the eyes of the international community.

Although this policy achieves several national objectives, it cannot guarantee the security of all our citizens both at home

and abroad, and only succeeds in violating our base national interests and values as a free and democratic nation. The ultimate risk of this strategy is best described by former Secretary of State, George Schultz. "The lesson for civilized nations is that we must respond to the terrorist threat within the rule of law, lest we become unwitting accomplices in the terrorist's scheme to undermine civilized society." 33

COA 2: MAXIMIZE COUNTER TERRORISM POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.

In contrast to COA 1, counter-terrorism is by definition passively defensive in nature. This strategy focuses on the application of resources toward heightened security of airports, embassies, and major installations, massive internal detection and preventative measures of terrorist acts, and the combined efforts engaged in the underlying social aspects of terrorism; economic, racial, geopolitical, etc.

It is widely accepted that the collection, development, and exploitation of timely and accurate intelligence is one of the keys-if not the key-to the implementation of effective counter-terrorism policies and actions.³⁴

The ability of the United States to unilaterally obtain all the information required in these diverse organizations is

virtually impossible. Multinational effort is imperative, however still difficult as discussed in COA #1.

Knowledge and information control - indeed information
warfare - is a major factor in defeating opposing forces. The
recent surge in information technology provides not only our
forces but also the terrorist with ready access to gain
intelligence, technology, or worse yet, offensively strive to
disrupt or destroy the information and computer networks of the
West. The ability of terrorists to tap into sensitive
information networks as compared to the cost of technology to
prevent such actions is grossly unbalanced.

Increased security of airports, embassies, military installations, centers of development and cultural identity are all mandatory first line counter-terrorist activities. Defending against traditional weapons at all these sites is a heavy task. Add the possibility of weapons of mass destruction and the outright defense of these structures increases exponentially. Obviously they can not all be covered at the same time. Intelligence again rests as the key to early identification of potential targets and actors.

Since the 1980s we have greatly improved airport security and monitoring, encircled high priority targets with crash barriers, and steadily improved the data based systems for

States. It should be noted however that although there are constant improvements, the task remains formidable and is inadequate at best. Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, leader of the faction involved in the World Trade Center bombing, was allowed to enter this country on three separate occasions.³⁵

The policy of utilizing the combined international economic efforts to engage the underlying aspects of terrorism; economic, racial, geopolitical, etc. have, on the surface, merit and worth. To presume there is a growing standard of living rift in the world is clear. Third world nations are not improving their status but rather falling further and further behind which only fuels the terrorist environment. There is however both an economic and diplomatic conflict in this strategy.

Economic sanctions have in the past provided a viable solution to deter nation states from supporting terrorist organizations. Unfortunately the sanctions often serve to only prejudice the innocent civilians of the nation as the leadership is not willing to curb its support to the terrorist.

Additionally, even if economic sanctions are lifted and financial support returned in a show of good will, there remains no

guarantee that terrorist sponsored support will not continue or utilize the very funds intended for the nations' citizens.

Although the counter-terrorist strategy meets the requirements for a comprehensive, acceptable, and long range policy, as a deterrent to terrorism, counter-terrorist activities are woefully fragile. The means and ways required to execute such a policy would quickly outweigh any budgetary proposal for the future. Our government alone cannot enforce a successful counter-measure program.

Even though there already exists a workable structure for countering terrorism, funding remains inadequate to support the agency. The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) was formed in 1986 for this very purpose. "Between 1986 and 1991, the State Department requested a total of \$54 million for the TSWG projects, yet Congress only approved \$25 million." 37

Counter-terrorist policy must become the responsibility of the international community, industry, and individuals alike.

Many experts also believe that any policy centered on counter-terrorism can only be effective with a comprehensive, effective, and credible anti-terrorist option as a last resort.³⁸

COA 3: FULL SUPPORT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE COALITION.

A policy toward the full integration of international cooperative capabilities including counter-terrorism, anti-terrorism, and combined international powers is the only real combat for terrorism.

Reflecting on historical precedence, current economic conditions, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the growing separation from the third world, and emerging asymmetrical threats, we can suggest a combined international strategy for combating terrorism in the future.

CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HARD LINE ON TERRORISM.

We have discussed the potential threat of folding to former terrorist rogues. "Terrorism thrives on weakness and it is naïve to think that the IRA does not take note of the periodic British courting of the PLO." Our international coalition is based on trust and a system of fairness. Violation of this policy can only serve to foster a environment of distrust in our resolve and dedication to the end of terrorism. No other element of this policy can work without the commitment to this first premise.

Our citizens, allies, and enemies alike base all other intentions on our resolve to stand by this difficult decision.

This policy does not intend to presume a system of nonattribution but rather a commitment to those nation states who demonstrate the willingness to reject terrorism and terrorist acts past, present and future.

COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE.

Recent events have proven that economic and political pressure is only effective when acted upon by an international community. Singularly, no one country can effect the response required to exact the necessary pressure. Political pressures are important because they show the terrorist state that the intended victim is not only unwilling to be compliant but is fully prepared to expose the offender to public opinion.⁴⁰

Economic pressure provides the absence of goods, funds, weapons, and trade required by every nation interested in progressing into the 21st century. Although the United States International Trade and Security Act of 1985 and the Export Administration Act continue to deny terrorist supporting states required goods and services as a nation, the combined international efforts can be so much more effective. "Of course,

this also has an effect on the countries which undertake these measures, and they must be prepared to shoulder such a burden."41

APPLY ACTIVE MILITARY MEASURES WHERE APPROPRIATE.

"If all nonlethal measures have been exhausted in a fight against terrorists, then military force may be the only alternative left to stop the killing of innocent people and the destruction of property." Although several countries have the where with all to support such actions, international agreement is needed to support those nations who do not have the capability to defend against or conduct offensive operations against those who chose to use their country for terrorist purposes.

Additionally, countries must be able to reserve the right to defend their own citizens in another nation even if that nation refuses to act. "At that moment it forfeits a certain measure of jurisdiction over the event." The raid on Entebbe, Uganda is a perfect example of such a policy. This has proven effective, just, and responsive to the terrorist threat.

COMBINED ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC POWER

Finally, it is imperative that the free states exercise effective counter-terrorism measures that combine the economic

and diplomatic power of their separate governments toward the common goal of peace. "Terrorism is a phenomenon which tries to evoke one feeling: fear. It is understandable that the one virtue most necessary to defeat terrorism is therefore the antithesis of fear: courage."

CONCLUSION

Greater international cooperation offers the benefit of collective intelligence gathering, effective and enforceable legal treaties which must include full extradition powers, and the collective knowledge, tactics and training for combined antiterrorist actions.⁴⁵

Obviously, the combined resources and strategies of coalition countries could provide the necessary budget, equipment, and personnel to effectively combat the terrorist threat. The cumulative national power - political, economic, military, and national will, is the only effective way democratic countries can combat the mounting threat of rouge terrorist states.

The terrorist challenge must be answered. The choice is between a free society based on law and compassion and a rampant barbarism in the service of brute force and tyranny. Confusion and vacillation facilitated the rise of terrorism. Clarity and courage will ensure its defeat.⁴⁶

For the West to survive in the new world order, cooperation, diligence, and an effective, enforceable and supportable international campaign against terrorism must be the solution.

"Only through unity is there strength".

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- ³³ George P. Schultz, "The Challenge to Democracies," in <u>Terrorism: How the West Can Win</u>, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New York, NY: Farrar, 1986), 17.
- ³⁴ David A. Charters, "Counterterrorism Intelligence: Sources, Methods, Process, Problems," in <u>Democratic Responses to International Terrorism</u> (Ardsley-on Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1991), 227.
 - ³⁵ Mebb., 308.
 - 36 Schultz., 23.
 - ³⁷ Mebb., 302.
 - ³⁸ Morris., 126.
- ³⁹ Benjamin Netanyahu, "Terrorism: How the West Can Win," in <u>Terrorism: How the West Can Win</u> (New York, NY: Farrar, 1986), 219.
 - 40 Ibid.
 - 41 Ibid., 213.
 - ⁴² Mebb., 306.
 - 43 Netanyahu., 215.
 - 44 Netanyahu., 226.
 - 45 Schultz., 22.
 - 46 Netanyahu., 226.

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